Audit Arizona Action

Monday, May 08, 2006

Questions that must be answered about Diebold in Pima

1. How can you recount ballots on these machines? If the Senate passes pending legislation, we will be recounting some ballots by hand, how do you recount using the computer tapes?

2. How does the voter know that his/her voter was correctly recorded - that the printout is the same as the computer memory?

3. .If the voter looks at the tape printout, and it differs from the voter's intent, can the person revote? How does a blind person check the accuracy of his/her vote?

4. If the machines are used for early voting at remote sites, how are the votes protected when the sites are closed? With paper ballots, at remote sites, the paper ballots are removed daily and secured. How will the computers be securely protected?

5. Why was a device not chosen that produces the same kind of paper ballots that are then put into scanners like all the other ballots? Illinois does it that way and specifically rejected this Diebold type of machine.

6. If only a few people use the touchscreen machines, how is ballot secrecy ensured?

7. What is the cost of buying and maintaining these machines?

8. Doesn't this create a two-class system whereby the disabled who use the machines have less voting security and secrecy than other people?

9. Some states have already rejected this type of device and lawsuits are pending. Why commit to these funds before the problems are resolved?

10. How will poll workers be trained to operate the touch screen machines, direct the disabled in correct procedures, and deal with possible glitches? Isn't this asking a lot of temporary help who are also operating the scanner system?

11. How is the accuracy of the count checked?

Posted by Protect Democracy :: 3:43 PM :: 2 comments

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